TOPGhazali's analysis of the mystical virtues occupies all of Quarter IV of the Revival, the largest quarter of the entire book. In his analysis, Ghazali emphatically asserts that the mystical virtues are the virtues par excellence, not because they describe man's relation to God, but because they are primarily the virtues of the few. Although he says that by the few he means the mystics, he points out in several places of Quarter IV of the Revival that the mystics have failed to reach a scientific understanding of these virtues. It is for this reason that he introduces the rational theoretical framework which he calls the tripartite characteristic of the mystical virtues. Ghazali also had recourse to other philosophic doctrines, such as the distinction between the rational psychic faculties on the one hand and the irascible and concupiscent on the other, which underlies many mystical virtues, especially those related to the states of the soul, namely, the supporting mystical virtues.
It is clear that Ghazali's "theoretical" approach to the mystical virtues is derived from the philosophic tradition. However, many of the specific features of his discussion, his ordering these virtues into a hierarchy, and regarding them as stations or spiritual states, all belong to the mystical tradition with which Ghazali identifies himself. Ghazali's discussion of mystical virtues resembles in a certain way his discussion of the philosophic virtues. In the latter case, the generally accepted interpretation is that Ghazali rejects the philosophic tradition; however, as his treatment of philosophic virtues develops, it becomes clear that he accepts the essential features of all the philosophic virtues while modifying them in terms of the religious-legal tradition and mystical teachings. In contrast, it is generally accepted that Ghazali accepts the mystical tradition completely; however, his method of dealing with the mystical virtues reveals his dissatisfaction with the usual mystical understanding of these virtues. By having recourse to the teachings of the philosophers, Ghazali creates a new framework within which the mystical virtues can be explained more consistently and precisely.
In addition to his attempt to explain certain aspects of the mystical virtues in terms of philosophic concepts, Ghazali deals with these virtues as essentially based on the Islamic religious tradition. In his view, and in the view of his major Sufi source, al-Makkī, these mystical virtues are nothing but the interpretation of the hidden meanings of the divine commandments; the only difference between these and the religious‐ legal virtues extracted from the external meanings of the divine commandments is the fact that the former are for the few, whereas the latter are for the many. We have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that, in selecting material for his mystical virtues, Ghazali singles out those mystics known for their effort to reconcile mysticism with Islamic teachings. He, in turn, tries to synthesize the mystical and Islamic traditions by showing that mystical virtues admit of degrees of excellence. The lower degrees are usually assigned to pious religious men, whereas the higher degrees can only be acquired by the mystics; it is to these higher degrees that the term mystical virtue most properly applies. In the cases of open conflict between some mystical virtues and Islamic teachings, Ghazali seeks to reconcile them by interpreting the religious teachings through the perspective of the mystical virtues.
In his description of the mystical virtues, Ghazali begins with everyday social or moral qualities, religious teachings, and human passions, abstracts them from their original context, and reformulates them in terms of the way of life of the few in search of nearness to God. It is particularly important to note, for example, that the first principal mystical virtue, repentance, is a well-known Islamic religious practice which Ghazali develops beyond its original religious limits to make it a virtue of the few. The highest mystical virtue, love of God, on the other hand, is a human passion discussed by the philosophers but never developed as a virtue. Ghazali begins with this passion in its accepted philosophic sense and directs it toward a new object, God, thus making it the ultimate virtue which can be acquired by man during this life.
Publication Information: Book Title: Ghazali's Theory of Virtue. Contributors: Mohamed Ahmed Sherif - author. Publisher: State University of New York Press. Place of Publication: Albany, NY. Publication Year: 1975.