The Place of Ethics in the Division of Sciences

Aside from his early manuals on jurisprudence (fiqh), the first work in which Ghazali speaks about ethics is the Aims of the Philosophers (Maqāsòid al-Falāsifah). This book was written some time after 484/ 1091-2 and before 486/ 1094, during the period of less than two years when he was studying philosophy in his spare time with the primary aim of understanding it. He discusses briefly three of the sciences of the philosophers, namely, logic, physics, and metaphysics. His purpose is to give objective accounts of these philosophic disciplines without comment. The refutation of these sciences, he says, will be made in a subsequent work.

Ghazali treats logic, metaphysics, and physics in this order. He prefaces his discussion of metaphysics with two introductory remarks. The first concerns the divisions of science. The science of wisdom al-'ilm al-hòikmī) is divided into two parts. The first deals with man's actions and is called practical science; it aims at finding out the human activities conducive to man's well-being in this life as well as in the next. The second makes known the states of beings as they are, and is called theoretical science. Now practical science is, in turn, divided into three parts. One is the science of the governance of man's relations with other men; it culminates in political science. The second is the science of the governance of the household; it teaches the manner of living with one's wife, children, and servants, as well as all other domestic affairs. Finally, "the third practical science is ethics ('ilm al-akhlāq), which deals with the way man ought to act to be good and virtuous in his character and qualities."

At the end of the Aims, Ghazali promises to refute certain philosophic sciences in the book entitled the Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifah), which appears to have been written about 488/ 1095. In this latter book he argues against the philosophers' views on physics and metaphysics, but allows logic to stand as an unobjectionable science. He retains the divisions of science introduced in the Aims, but now he openly identifies his philosophic sources, the writings of Avicenna and al-Fārābī, who are, according to him, the best representatives of the Muslim philosophers, and the only ones who truly understood Aristotle, the master of Greek philosophy. Ghazali's division of the sciences seems to be particularly influenced by Avicenna, who also divides practical science into the three parts mentioned by Ghazali in the Aims. In the introduction to his major work, the Healing (al-Shifā'), Avicenna draws the same distinction between theoretical and practical sciences and then distinguishes the same three divisions of the practical sciences, namely, political science, household management, and ethics ('ilm al-akhlāq). This division differs substantially from that of al-Fārābī in the Enumeration of the Sciences (Ihòsòā' al-'Ulūm) which does not mention an independent science of ethics but includes it in political science without mentioning it by name. Ghazali prefers Avicenna's division in which ethics is a relatively independent practical science—independent, that is, from political science.

The first statement of Ghazali on ethics is presented within a context which suggests that it is borrowed from the philosophers. A more personal and positive statement is found in two other works, which chronologically follow each other in the way that the Aims is followed by the Incoherence. They are the Standard of knowledge (Mi'yār al-'ilm), and the Criterion of Action (Mīzān al-'Amal).

The Standard is an exposition of logic, appended to the Incoherence and perhaps written after the latter. In it Ghazali argues that learned Muslims can accept Aristotelian logic without having to subscribe to other philosophic doctrines, and he endorses Avicenna's analysis of the status of nondemonstrative premises by drawing heavily on the sixth tract of the logic in Avicenna's al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt. But he does not necessarily commit himself to Avicenna's specific ethical teachings. Rather, he adapts the analysis of ethical premises, by enlarging and blending them with Islamic theological concepts and thereby he elucidates their importance for strictly Islamic learning.

In the Criterion Ghazali promises to apply these ethical premises to the knowledge and action which lead to ultimate happiness. His procedures in this book, he claims, go beyond mere blind imitation (taqlīd); if perfectly applied it can reach the level of demonstration according to the conditions stated in the Standard. The exact date of the Criterion is rather difficult to establish and all that can be said on the basis of external and internal evidence is that this book was written sometime during the transitional period after Ghazali finished his study of philosophy and started his inquiry into mysticism. In any event, it is certain that the Criterion chronologically follows the Standard.

The book is composed of thrity sections of unequal length, each of which is called an "exposition" (bayān). Although there is no explicit division into chapters that cover groups of sections, some of these sections can still be considered key sections and they serve to divide the book into its larger parts. Of these we mention the following:

(I) Neglect of seeking happiness is folly.

(3) The way to happiness is knowledge and action.

(4) Refinement of the soul, its faculties, and its character qualities.

(14) The specific way of character training.

(15) Principal virtues.

(19) Excellence of reason, knowledge, and instruction.

(29) The sign of the first resting place of those who seek God.

It is evident from the title that the Criterion deals with "action" ('amal). Its aim is to discover the means of discerning and bringing about the "good action" which leads to happiness. The book, therefore, is an inquiry into the kinds of knowledge and action which are relevant to man's highest end. Ghazali confirms the division of sciences and the view that ethics is a practical science, which were given in the Aims. After drawing a distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge in a way similar to that which he attributes to the philosophers in the Aims, he says:

Practical science consists of three sciences: The science of the soul in respect to its qualities and character [ethics] ... The science which deals with how man ought to conduct himself with his wife, children, servants, and slaves [household management] ... The science of governing the people of the city and the region [politics].

The significance of this statement is that here Ghazali adopts the philosophic ( Avicennan) division of sciences as his own. More important, however, is the order which he introduces: the first of the three practical sciences, i.e., ethics, is the highest of the three, and the most important practical science. Furthermore, Ghazali concludes this statement by declaring that ethics is conceived here as "the greater aim of this book [i.e., the Criterion]." These statements occur in a book devoted to ethics and are not merely passing remarks in books dealing with other disciplines.

Ghazali repeats the assertion that ethics is a practical science in another part of the Criterion, emphasizing these same points again.

Other statements in the Criterion serve to elaborate and modify Ghazali's attitude as presented thus far. In the Criterion he presents a psychological analysis of the soul which he attributes in the Aims and the Incoherence to the philosophic tradition. On the basis of this analysis, he discusses the virtues and explains how they lead to ultimate happiness. Since ultimate happiness, according to Ghazali, can only be realized in the hereafter, he brings in mysticism—that is, the discipline of character training—further to support the aim of ethics. In a section which deals with the difference between the rational and mystical approaches to knowledge and action, he shows that there is agreement between the two with regard to action (jānib al-'amal muttafaq 'alayh), but that they differ with regard to knowledge. The term "action" here apparently covers a wider sense of ethics and includes spiritual refinement as well as worship ('ibādah). In another part of the Criterion, Ghazali presents a different account according to which the sciences are divided into religious (shar'iyyah) and rational ('aqliyyah), and he argues that these complement each other and are never contradictory. Yet in the same section he divides the sciences acquired by the intellect into worldly (dunyawiyyah) and other-worldly (ukhrawiyyah), and, according to him, these oppose each other. "Good action" here is associated with the other-worldly sciences. Thus, Ghazali's view of ethics in the Criterion starts as a philosophic view and then expands to include certain mystical and Islamic religious elements. It can be characterized as follows: (I) Ethics is independent of politics and is primarily concerned with the moral refinement of the individual. This confirms, of course, Ghazali's previous adoption of Avicenna's view of ethics as an independent practical science. (2) Ethics is a fundamental discipline which not only serves all other sciences but also is served by them.

This second characteristic is elaborated in the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihòyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn), which is acknowledged by all students of Islamic thought to be Ghazali's magnum opus. Ghazali himself considered it his greatest work and defended it in another book written for the sole purpose of answering objections raised about the Revival. He also composed two summaries of it, one in Arabic, and a longer one in Persian. The work must have been written over a number of years. It seems that Ghazali started composing it after writing the Jerusalem Tract (al-Risālah al-Qudsiyyah), during his stay in Jerusalem because the Tract is incorporated in the second book of the first part of the Revival, where Ghazali discusses the rules of the articles of faith: "Let us be satisfied thererom with what we have written to the people of Jerusalem, which we called the Jerusalem Tract Concerning the Articles of Faith." In the Deliverer, Ghazali says that he left Baghdad for Damascus in 488/ 1096; then, after spending about two years there he proceeded to Jerusalem. Thus, Ghazali could not have reached Jerusalem before the beginning of 491 ( December 9, 1097) and the Revival could not have been begun before 491/ 1098, or sometime during Ghazali's subsequent travels to Mecca and Madina and back to Khurāsān.

The large number of existing manuscripts of this book, the still larger number of books written in its defense, and the commentaries on it, testify to its great influence on Islamic thought. Our inquiry into Ghazali's attitude toward ethics in this vast and influential work must begin with a few introductory remarks. In the title, the term "religion" (dīn) was the subject of different and even opposing interpretations which, in turn, gave rise to different opinions concerning the "readers" for whom the Revival was written. While the choice of this ambiguous term may have been deliberate the reader can nevertheless find a precise definition of dīn in the work itself: "We mean by religion (dīn) the devotional practice (mu'āmalah) between man and his Lord." Therefore, "religious science" does not mean jurisprudence, theology, or Islamic traditional learning in general, but a discipline whose central concern is how to establish and maintain a special spiritual relation with God. The Revival is not a religious book which shows Muslims how to perform religious rituals, although it does speak about them. Nevertheless, it is a work intended for all Muslims. It starts from things which are commonly known to the members of the Islamic community, but seeks to emphasize their spiritual significance so that some of them may become candidates for higher spiritual refinement, while the rest may enrich their ritualistic acts of worship and render them more spiritual. It is in this restricted sense that Ghazali considers the theme of the Revival the "science of the way to the hereafter" ('ilm tòarīq al-ākhirah).

The Revival is divided into four parts and each part consists of ten books, making a total of forty books, which are preceded by a preface. Some of the books are divided into an unequal number of chapters, which in turn are subdivided into sections. Others are not divided into chapters but only into sections. As to the division into four parts, Ghazali explains in the preface that, in order to insure a wide circulation, he followed the external arrangement of the most popular books of his day. These dealt with jurisprudence, and were always divided into four parts, one for each part of the Islamic Law. This, however, is only a secondary motive. The principal reason for the fourfold division is Ghazali's division of "the knowledge of the way to the hereafter" into the "science of devotional practice" ('ilm al-mu'āmalah) and the "science of revelation" ('ilm al-mukāshafah). The latter consists of knowledge alone, while the former covers knowledge as well as action in accordance with knowledge. Ghazali states openly that the purpose of the Revival is the explanation of the science of devotional practice and not the science of revelation, which it is not permissible to write down in books, even though it is the ultimate aim of the seekers of ultimate happiness and the end of the science of devotional practice. This science which is the subject of the Revival is, in turn, divided into external (zòāhir) knowledge, namely, of the actions of the members of the body, and internal (bātòin) knowledge, namely of the inner deeps of the soul. The external knowledge is divided into acts of worship ('ibādāt), that is, acts of devotion directed to God alone, and customs ('ādāt), that is, types of actions directed toward one's fellow men; likewise internal knowledge is divided into destructive qualities of the soul (muhlikāt) and qualities leading to salvation (munjiyāt). Following these divisions, the Revival is divided into two major parts, the first dealing with the external and the second with the internal division, and each of these, in turn, is divided into two parts. The results are the four "quarters" bearing the names of the four divisions of the science of spiritual practice, respectively.

Without entering now into a detailed discussion of the science of revelation or the science of spiritual practice, it can be said that in the "formal" sense defined in the preface to the Revival, they seem to correspond, broadly speaking, to theoretical and practical knowledge as presented in the Criterion. Hence the entire Revival deals with practical and not theoretical knowledge. However, the Revival deals with practical knowledge of a certain kind. 'Amal, which is the subject of the Criterion and mu'āmalah, which is the subject of the Revival, are both derived from the same verb root and their meanings are related. The former is a more general and loose form, whereas the latter is more defined and specific. While both works deal with actions as means to the ultimate happiness of the hereafter, the Revival offers a more elaborate discussion of the actions pertaining to the devotional practices which are mentioned briefly in the Criterion.

Ghazali's view of ethics is stated in the three books of the Revival (Quarter I, Book I, Quarter III, Books I and 2), which preface the two major divisions of this work and which serve, therefore, as "introductions." The first, which is the first book of the first quarter of the Revival, is a general introduction to the entire work. This is the "Book of knowledge" ( kitāb al-'Ilm). The second is an introduction designed especially for the first and second books of the third quarter, namely, the "Book of the Explanation of the Wonders of the Heart" ( kitāb Sharhò 'Ajā'ib al-Qalb) and the "Book of Training the Soul, Refining Character, and Treating the Diseases of the Heart" ( Kitāb Riyādòat al-Nafs wa Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq wa Mu'ālajat Amrādò al-Qalb).

In the "Book of knowledge," Ghazali explains that knowledge is praise-worthy in itself, and an excellent means to ultimate and eternal happiness. Knowledge of the way to the hereafter is only apprehended through the perfection of reason ('aql), which is man's noblest faculty. Ghazali's main purpose in this general introduction of the Revival is to discuss the different types of knowledge to show which are commendable and which are blameworthy. In the second chapter of this book he quotes a prophetic tradition which says: "Seeking knowledge ('ilm) is a religious duty for every Muslim," and adds that, because of this tradition, as many as twenty Islamic disciplines professed to be that very "knowledge" which Muhammad commanded the Muslims to seek. The theologians assumed that it was dialectical theology, the jurists jurisprudence, and so on. But Ghazali criticizes and rejects all these claims. For him, the only "knowledge" meant in the above prophetic tradition is that of devotional practice (mu'āmalah), because it is this knowledge which comprises belief in God, His Prophet, and all His creation, as well as carrying out religious duties and refraining from what is forbidden. It is only in this sense that knowledge is "a religious duty incumbent on every individual" (fardò 'ayn).

Ghazali then turns to the division of the sciences into religious (shar'iyyah) and non-religious (ghayr shar'iyyah). His choice of terminology here tacitly gives priority to the religious sciences before he even identifies what the non-religious sciences are. The non-religious sciences are divided into commendable, such as medicine and mathematics; forbidden, such as magic; and permissible, such as poetry and history. Although all the religious sciences are commendable, they may become mixed with something blameworthy and for this reason become blameworthy. Commendable religious sciences are divided into four parts, namely, fundamental principles (usòūl), branches (furū'), preludes (muqaddimāt) and supplements (mutammimāt). The science of the fundamental principles is in turn divided into four parts, namely, the Koran, the prophetic tradition of Muhammad, the consensus of the Islamic community, and the traditions of the Companions. The science of the branches is the knowledge of the true interpretation of these fundamental principles. It is divided into two kinds. The first, concerned with worldly affairs, is included in the manuals of jurisprudence. The other is concerned with other worldly things. The third of the religious sciences, the preludes, provides instruments for the two religious sciences mentioned above, e.g., language and grammar as means of understanding the Koran. The fourth religious science, that of the supplements, such as the science of the Koran and of the principles of jurisprudence, deals with things that perfect or provide a full understanding of religious sciences.

Ghazali is particularly interested in the second religious science, i.e., the science of the branches; and within this science, he favors the part he calls the science of the hereafter over jurisprudence, which he regards an inferior worldly discipline. The science of the hereafter, according to Ghazali, is divided into two parts. The first is knowledge of revelation, through which one attains true and direct knowledge of God. The second is the science of devotional practice (mu'āmalah), which is the science of the states of the heart ('ilm ahwāl al-qalb). It provides knowledge of noble and base character traits of the soul, which is the subject of the entire second half of the Revival, and knowledge of the "effects" of the states of the heart on the members of the body when practicing the acts of worship and the customs, which is the subject of the entire first half of the work. Ghazali then gives a partial list of virtues and vices which are made known by the science of devotional practice.

In dividing the sciences in the "Book of knowledge," therefore, Ghazali considers ethics as part of a religious science—the science of devotional practice—whose aim is to seek the ultimate happiness of the hereafter. He distinguishes this science from the other religious sciences, especially jurisprudence which is primarily concerned with the external worldly affairs of men. Jurisprudence, in Ghazali's view, is relevant only in the second degree for the attainment of the ultimate happiness in the hereafter. Furthermore, the science of devotional practice is also distinguished from dialectical theology, which for Ghazali is permitted only for the sake of defending religion against the arguments of innovators; aside from the ability to refute innovators, theologians have the same knowledge or belief as the multitude. More significant, however, is the fact that in this (second) chapter of the "Book of knowledge," Ghazali discusses philosophy for the sake of judging whether it is commendable or blameworthy. He lists the four philosophic sciences he had listed in the Aims (mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and physics), placing those he finds acceptable within the province of dialectical theology. He does not list the practical philosophic sciences and consequently does not judge whether they are commendable or not.

It is necessary now to compare Ghazali's view of ethics as embodied in the division of sciences just described with the view of ethics which emerges in the (more particular) introduction of the second half of the Revival. There Ghazali changes his terminology and divides the sciences which "reside in the heart' into rational ('aqliyyah) and religious (shar‐ 'iyyah). By the former is meant the knowledge attained solely by the human intellect, and by the latter, the knowledge received from the prophets. In this account Ghazali discusses the merits of both rational and religious sciences in an attempt to reconcile them. He states that rational sciences are not sufficient by themselves for achieving purification of the soul, although they are necessary for that. For this reason, they have to be complemented by the religious sciences. In the same manner, the religious sciences must be supported by the rational sciences. These two sciences are like food and medicine for man respectively; without them he cannot achieve his perfection, and no one who is in his right mind, according to Ghazali, should reject one or the other.

This praise of both the religious and rational sciences is obviously intended to gain approval for the rational sciences. Aside from showing that religious science is in agreement with the rational and must be complemented by it, Ghazali does not present any subdivisions of the former, while he gives an elaborate analysis of the latter. Rational sciences, according to Ghazali, are divided into necessary or inborn (dòarūiyyah) and acquired (muktasabah). Inasmuch as they are acquired, rational sciences are divided into worldly and otherworldly. The worldly rational sciences consist of medicine, mathematics, and the like. The otherworldly rational sciences comprise the science of the states of the heart ('ilm ahwāl al-qalb), and the knowledge of God, His attributes, and creation. The relation between worldly and otherworldly sciences is one of opposition in the sense that the man who occupies himself with one of them departs from the other. Thus, while Ghazali classifies ethics as a religious science in the general introduction of the Revival, he classifies it as a rational science in the more particular introduction to the part concerned with the hidden or internal aspects of the soul. This classification corresponds to a similar one in the Criterion, in which Ghazali draws upon the philosophic view of ethics as a practical science.

In addition to these two views of ethics (as a religious and as a rational science), Ghazali adds a third view (already pointed to in the Criterion), namely, ethics as a mystical discipline. He takes up this subject in his discussion of the sources of knowledge. According to him, knowledge is either acquired through education and instruction, or occurs without acquisition. The former is called reflection (i'tibār). The latter is called inspiration (ilhām) when its source is not known (this is the knowledge of the mystic saints) and revelation (wahòy) when its source is known to man (this is the knowledge of the prophets). Now, while men of wisdom occupy themselves with reflection and seek to acquire knowledge through inquiry beginning with observation of physical phenomena, the mystics engage only in the purification of their souls and the refinement of their character so that knowledge may shine in their hearts through inspiration. Therefore, ethics is the main or essential ingredient in the mystical approach to knowledge.

Keeping these three views of ethics in mind, we shall now examine Ghazali's views in the principal works which come after the Revival.

The Treatise on Mystical Knowledge (al-Risālah al-Laduniyyah) is a shorter work which belongs to the latter period of Ghazali's writing and is considered to have been written sometime after the Revival. The aim of this book is to explain what mystical knowledge is and prove the possibility of acquiring such knowledge. Ghazali devotes a special section to the division of knowledge into religious and rational. "Most of the branches of religious knowledge are rational in the opinion of him who knows them and most of the branches of rational knowledge are religious in the eyes of him who knows them." ^i. From the start, this division of knowledge is conciliatory in tone. Religious knowledge is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the fundamental principles and includes knowledge of the essence of God and His attributes as well as knowledge of the states of prophets and of the rest of creation. According to Ghazali, this is theoretical knowledge. The second part of religious knowledge is that of the branches (furū'); this is practical knowledge and comprises three kinds of obligations. The first is what is due to God, i.e., acts of worship; the second is what is due to one's fellow men, i.e., customs; and the third is what is due to one's own soul, i.e., ethics ('ilm al-akhlāq).

As for rational knowledge, Ghazali says that it is a difficult discipline. It is divided into three classes. The first class comprises mathematics and logic, and mathematics includes arithmetic, geometry, and music. The second class is physics, which includes medicine, minerology, and the rest of the natural sciences. The third and highest of the classes of rational knowledge, i.e., metaphysics, investigates existence and its divisions into necessary and contingent and reflects on the Creator, His essence, and attributes. Thus, in this division of knowledge, Ghazali classifies ethics as a religious science. However, he also calls it specifically "ethics" and does not give it a different name as he does when classifying it among the religious sciences in the Revival. Furthermore, he explicitly applies the terms "theoretical" and "practical" to religious knowledge, indicating that ethics belongs to practical religious knowledge.

After thus dividing knowledge into religious and rational, Ghazali maintains that both divisions lead to a kind of knowledge which is a combination of both. This (i.e., the knowledge which is both religious and rational), he says, is the knowledge of the mystics. Thus, ethics is indirectly incorporated in mysticism. In discussing the methods of acquiring knowledge, Ghazali offers the same view he expressed in the Revival: knowledge is acquired through human instruction and/or through divine teaching. Divine teaching is of two types—revelation and inspiration—and the latter follows upon the former, for revelation is the clear manifestation of the divine command, while inspiration is hinting at the command. The knowledge which is derived from inspiration is called knowledge from On High ('ilm Ladunī), i.e., mystical knowledge.

It is the knowledge attained when there is no longer an intermediary between the soul and the Creator. In this book, mystical knowledge is higher than religious and rational knowledge. Therefore, although ethics is classified here as a religious science sharing some of the characteristics of rational sciences, it is ultimately incorporated in the domain of mysticism.

It is in The Deliverer from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dòalāl) that Ghazali explicitly classifies ethics as a mystical discipline. This book, whose authenticity has never been questioned, is Ghazali's intellectual autobiography. He must have written it after his return to Nīshāpūr in Dhū al-Qa'dah, 499/ July, 1106. Thus, it is one of his last works. But although it is on the basis of this book that the dates of some of the earlier works have been established, we cannot tell how long before his death it was written. In this book, Ghazali gives an analysis of different branches of knowledge which he says he had studied thoroughly for the purpose of attaining certainty. After presenting accounts of dialectical theology, philosophy, authoritative instruction (ta'līm of the Ismā'īlis), and mysticism, he concludes that certainty can only be found in mysticism. The first expression of Ghazali's attitude to ethics in this book occurs in his discussion of the various philosophic sciences. He enumerates six philosophic sciences: mathematics, logic, physics, metaphysics, politics, and ethics. From this list it is clear that he considers ethics a philosophic discipline independent from politics.

As for ethics, all their [the philosophers'] discussion of it consists in defining the qualities and character of the soul, and enumerating the various genera and species of these qualities, and the method of moderating and controlling them. This they have borrowed from the teachings of the mystics ... In their spiritual striving these mystics have learned about the virtues and vices of the soul and the defects in its actions, and what they have learned they clearly expressed. The philosophers have taken over this teaching and mingled it with their own disquisitions, furtively using them to sell their falsehood. Assuredly there was in the age of the philosophers, as indeed there is in every age, a group of those godly men, of whom God never denudes the world.

This statement has been quoted in its entirety to indicate the many levels of Ghazali's argument. Philosophic ethics is acceptable in itself. What is bad is the philosophers' use of it to spread the false notions of their other disciplines. Ghazali does not credit the philosophers with originating their ethics, but regards it as a discipline which they borrowed from the mystics. It is significant here that ethics is not said to have been borrowed from the prophets (as is the case with politics), but from the mystics, and this emphasizes the fact that ethics deals with individual personal refinement of character. Since ethics has been incorporated by the philosophers in their disciplines, it presents two dangers. The first is that it may be rejected by men of slight intellect, who reject everything that comes from the philosophers. The second is that some weak people who accept philosophic ethics may gradually come to believe the falsehoods taught by the philosophers. It is, therefore, necessary to abstain from reading the books of the philosophers on account of the deception and dangers contained in them. It is in relation to the first danger that Ghazali mentions accusations made against himself by men of little insight on the ground that his books include statements taken from the works of the ancient philosophers (al-awā'il). The fact is, he answers, that some of these statements are the product of reflections which occurred to him independently while others come from the revealed scriptures, and in the case of the majority of these statements, the sense, though perhaps not the actual words, is found in the works of the mystics. But suppose, he adds, that these statements are found only in the books of the philosophers. "If they are reasonable in themselves and supported by proof, and if they do not contradict the Koran and the prophetic practice, then it is not necessary to abstain from using them."

In this first statement on ethics in the Deliverer Ghazali views ethics, therefore, as originating in the teachings of mystics. The rest of the book only confirms this view. Thus, in a special section on mysticism, he maintains that the mystics' character qualities are so pure and refined that no one can add anything to improve them further. This view of mysticism, however, does not imply a rejection of philosophic ethics, which is accepted on the assumption of its mystical origin, nor does it in any way cast doubt on ethics as a religious discipline.

All the views on ethics which have been discussed in Ghazali's principal works seem to coexist on different levels of emphasis according to the aim for which each work was written.