By dealing with love (mahòabbah) immediately after trust, Ghazali departs from the method of al-Makkī who places satisfaction (rīdòā) after trust, and then follows it with love. For Ghazali, satisfaction, together with yearning (shawq) and intimacy (uns), are the fruits of love, that is, its consequences. Indeed, Ghazali calls Book 6 of Quarter IV of the Revival, in which he discusses love, "The Book of Love, Yearning, Intimacy, and Satisfaction," and so reveals the relative order he assigns to these mystical virtues. In spite of this, however, he agrees with al‐ Makkī that "love of God is the final aim and the highest station" and emphasizes that any station beyond love of God, such as yearning, intimacy, or satisfaction, is but its product, and the stations before it, such as repentance, patience, asceticism, and the others mentioned above, only lead to and prepare for it.

Therefore, love as a mystical virtue is understood as love of God. In Ghazali's view, it is the most important mystical virtue but it is also one of the controversial mystical virtues. Some Islamic religious thinkers had contested the possibility of its existence and doubted its compatibility with Islamic teachings. Before analyzing such an important virtue, therefore, Ghazali considers it necessary to establish its existence and compatibility with Islam. Although Aristotle affirms that there can be no love between man and God because the distance between them is too great, Ghazali's argument against those who deny the love of God is primarily directed against Muslim traditionalists and certain dialectical theologians. These thinkers interpret the Koranic verses "He loveth them and they love Him," and "Those who believe have stronger love for God," to mean not love but some other duty such as obedience. ^2. They argue that love of God is impossible, because love exists only between members of the same genus and God is too high above us to inspire human emotions. According to Ghazali, this interpretation of love in terms of obedience is misleading because obedience is a consequence of love and love precedes it. On the basis of these Koranic verses and a score of prophetic traditions, and what he believes to be a unanimous agreement (ijmā') in the Islamic community that love of God is a religious duty, Ghazali assures us that love of God is not only compatible with Islamic religious teachings but required by them. For him, objections to love of God are usually caused by a misunderstanding of its definition. To obtain a perfect definition of love of God, one must know what love is in general, its conditions, and finally its applicability to God.

What man perceives in the world can be divided into three classes: (I) what is harmonious with his natural disposition and, thus, produces pleasure and then love in the beholder; (2) what conflicts with his natural disposition, produces pain, and is therefore hated; (3) what is neutral and thus neither loved nor hated. A man of sound nature will love and seek that which gives him pleasure, and hate and avoid the painful. Therefore, "love is the inclination of nature (mayl atò-tòab') to that which gives pleasure."

There are five classes of pleasurable objects of love: those perceived by the five senses. Such pleasures can be shared by all animals. Were there no other senses, then God could not be loved, because He cannot be perceived by the senses or represented by images. But there is another, sixth sense, which characterizes man and differentiates him from animals. This may be called "intellect," or "light," or "heart," or something else. It is an inner sight, stronger than external sight. Its perceptions are more powerful, and the beauty of what is perceived by it is greater. The delight of the heart in perceiving sublime divine objects is, therefore, superior to the pleasures derived from the five senses.

Ghazali discusses five categories of love. (I) Every living being loves itself first. Self-love means that by nature every living being has a desire to persevere in its existence and avoid death. Since that which is loved by nature is what is agreeable to the lover, and nothing is more agreeable to him than his own self, man loves his own existence and fears death, not only out of fear of pain or of punishment in the hereafter, but because death will put an end to his existence. This love naturally extends to the perfection of an individual's existence and everything that helps to preserve that perfection. Thus, each man's first love is for himself; then for the soundness of his members; then his property, children, kinsfolk, and friends. These things are only loved, in this sense, because man's existence and perfection depend on them. Ghazali gives an example of how man's love of his children is related to his self-love. He says that man loves his children when he does not receive any benefit from them, because they continue to exist after he does. The continuity of the existence of offspring is a kind of continuity of the existence of one's self. Still, if a man were motivated only by this natural disposition (wa kāna tab'uhu 'alā i'tidālih) and had to choose between being killed himself or having his child killed, he would choose his own existence rather than that of his child because the life of his child only resembles his own. (2) The second category of love is benefit. Man loves those who benefit him and can thus love a stranger to whom no blood ties bind him. This second object of love concerns only the means to one's own existence. It is in the nature of the love of the means that, once the aim is attained, the means lose their value. (3) Man may love something other than himself for its own sake, not for any benefit he may receive from it. This love by itself causes him happiness. It is a true and perfect love, inasmuch as its object is beyond a man's own existence. Beauty, for instance, is loved in this way: for the perception of beauty is a delight, loved for its own sake and not for the satisfaction of physical desires. Verdant plants and running water are loved in themselves apart from their usefulness for man's survival. (4) Man loves beauty in general. The term "beauty" (hòusn) can be applied to things not perceived by the senses as well as to well-proportioned shapes and agreeable colors. Beauty in anything means that there exists in it the perfection that befits it. Thus, when we speak of a beautiful character of a man, for example, we refer to the good qualities which are not perceived by the senses but by the inner sight. Thus, the one who loves the saint or the prophet, loves him because of the beauty of his character. (5) The fifth category of love is the mysterious, hidden relationship (al-munāsabah al-khafiyyah) which exists between two persons, not because of beauty or any advantage, but solely as a result of a certain spiritual affinity between them.

Were one man to have all five qualities which evoke love, he would inspire more intense love than someone endowed with only one or two qualities. However, only in God are all five qualities in their perfect form united. Hence, it is only God who is an object of love in the ultimate sense. For, although individual men may be objects of love in one of the five ways, that any human evokes love in all five ways is mere illusion. Ghazali then applies these five categories to love of God. (I) As to man's love of his own existence, he who knows himself and God knows absolutely that his existence, survival, and perfection depend on God alone. Nothing exists by itself; everything receives its existence through God who truly exists by Himself. If a man does not love God, it is because he does not understand himself and because of his love of himself. (2) Love of benefit must lead man to love of God once he knows that God is the ultimate cause of all benefit. In the last analysis, a man bestows favors only on himself, never on others. When he gives to others, he aims at a reward such as entering paradise. Therefore, no man has a right to be thanked and loved for favors since it is God who enables him to act and since in doing good deeds he really seeks to benefit himself. (3) True love for a benefactor without expecting any favors from him also requires the love of God, because God is the benefactor of the whole of creation and all things created. Ghazali cites several examples of God's special favors for men and asks, how could there be another benefactor in addition to God? (4) As to the love of beauty for its own sake, he who loves the prophet or a saint does not love him for his external beauty but for the inner beauty which his actions and character suggest. But, in reality, the good qualities which form such inner beauty belong, in their most perfect state, to God alone. Being created implies being imperfect. All perfection but God's is relative. (5) Spiritual affinity is based on something visible or hidden. Ghazali says that this affinity also exists between man and God, but it cannot be expressed because of its relation to the knowledge of revelation, and only when one experiences the higher mystical station can he have a "taste" (dhawq) of love of God based on this affinity. However, Ghazali maintains that this kind of love is metaphorically mentioned in a prophetic tradition in which Muhòammad relates that God says: "My servant continues to approach Me with supererogatory practices till I love him, and when I love him, I become the hearing through which he hears, the sight through which he sees, and the tongue by which he speaks."

This discussion of the objects of love in general and the way they can be applied to the love of God has been pursued in some detail in order to show how Ghazali uses nonmystical sources to explain a mystical virtue. It is clear that he appeals to the philosophic tradition, especially that of Aristotle, for an exposition of love in general which he applies to his analysis of the love of God. In order to see how this procedure contributes to the systemization and clarification of a mystical virtue, one need only compare Ghazali's account of love of God with that of al-Makkī and al-Qushayrī. However, the philosophers do not regard love as a virtue but rather as a passion. By considering love of God as a mystical virtue, Ghazali shows how such a passion can become not only another mystical virtue, but also the highest mystical virtue. For this purpose, he relates this passion of love to God through the highest form of knowledge, that is, knowledge of Him.

In his discussion of love of God, Ghazali does not mention explicitly the three components of the mystical virtues, i.e., knowledge, positive disposition, and action. However, his discussion of the necessary relation between knowledge and love of God, which is obviously a positive disposition as he defines it, and his accounts of the activities of those who are experiencing love show that these three elements are assumed in this mystical virtue. The element of knowledge deserves special attention because, although knowledge, according to Ghazali, is an element in all mystical virtues, it is most prominent in his discussion of love of God, and we are even given hints of an esoteric (bātòin) knowledge which is not to be written down in books. On the other hand, Ghazali does not deal with an independent mystical virtue called "knowledge" as al-Qushayrī, for example, does.

When he speaks of knowledge of God Ghazali means an intuitive theoretical knowledge which produces a joy and a pleasure that do not end with death. He distinguishes two ways which lead to this highest knowledge. (I) The way of those who are strong in their apprehension and devotion. These know God first and then know other things through Him. (2) The way of the weak, who know God's works first and, through these, gradually ascend to some perception of the Creator. The first way, according to Ghazali, is the esoteric knowledge which cannot be expressed in writing. Although he calls the second the way of the weak he says it is actually very difficult in itself. It can only be achieved through meditation which requires freedom from desires of worldly things. Because of the infinity of the objects to be known, this process can never be complete, but it can produce love of God.

Ghazali emphasizes that love of God can only be attained in this life, although it assures man of ultimate happiness in the hereafter. Ultimate happiness admits of degrees in proportion to the strength of man's love of God. Vision of God (ru'yat Allāh) is the highest happiness that man can attain in the hereafter if his love of God reaches the utmost degree in this life. The purification of the heart from worldly things is attained through careful training in the mystical life. When this is done, knowledge of all that is God's is the means of securing, preserving, and strengthening the love of God.

Since men differ in their desire for worldly things and their capacity for knowledge, it is natural that they differ in their love of God. Love of God and desire for worldly things pull man in opposite directions, so that love of God increases when the desire for worldly things decreases and vice versa. In contrast, there is a certain correspondence between love of God and knowledge in general; the more man understands, the greater his love will be. Therefore, one reason for imperfect love of God is weakness in man's knowledge of Him. If God is the most evident of all things, then the knowledge of Him ought to come first in time and be the easiest to obtain. Nevertheless, things do not happen in this way. The reason, according to Ghazali, is that knowledge of God comes late in man's development, after he has acquired certain moral and intellectual habits. Furthermore, our intellects are too weak to grasp the majesty and splendor of God which illuminate everything. It seems strange that God's evidence is the cause of His being hidden. Generally, however, things are understood by means of their opposites. If some things indicated God's existence while others denied it, it would be much easier for us to perceive the difference. If the sun never set and if we lived in perpetual light, we would never be able to know the existence of light, which we learn only through its negation, darkness. Therefore, a mystic who sets out to seek the highest mystical virtue, i.e., love of God, must achieve knowledge of God after he has already purified his soul from love of anything other than Him.

To distinguish true love of God from apparent love, Ghazali enumerates a large number of signs through which true love can be known. For example, a man who truly loves God will desire to meet Him and, consequently, will not fear death but love it. Hating death is a sign of incomplete love of God. But there is one case in which the man who loves God may not desire to die for the time being, namely, when he is not quite prepared to meet his Beloved and wishes to prepare himself better by means of more devotional practices. He who loves God will also prefer God's will to what he himself desires and will find obedience to God pleasing. Indeed, he who loves God will love to be alone so as to meditate upon Him, and will find pleasure in isolation and pain and discomfort in associating with others. He will love all those who obey God and hate all His enemies. The different signs of true love of God and the examples of how true lovers of God behave show that there are infinite degrees of love of God. But Ghazali is interested in demonstrating the essential characteristics of the true love of God which is based on knowledge of Him. This is the love of God which is the highest mystical virtue. When this love of God is achieved, it leads to the vision of God in the hereafter, which is the highest rank of ultimate happiness, higher than the happiness of paradise. It is in relation to these two levels of ultimate happiness that Ghazali says there are two kinds of love of God: love of Him because of His majesty alone and love of Him because He is the true Benefactor.

As to the question whether God loves His servants, Ghazali's approach changes when he ends his treatment of man's love of God. He admits that there are Koranic verses as well as prophetic traditions which speak of God's love of man, for example, the Koranic verse quoted above: "He loveth them, and they love Him." While he opposes the theologians and traditionalists who seek to interpret man's love of God as obedience, he himself maintains that as to the question of God's love of His creatures, the word love cannot have the same meaning as when it is applied to man. This is so because all the words we use have a different sense when applied to God and can be applied to God only metaphorically. Love in man implies a need and a deficiency, which are impossible for God, who possesses all perfection, all beauty, and all majesty eternally and necessarily. Therefore, God loves only Himself. What is said about His love of His servants must be taken in a metaphorical or allegorical sense, that is, it means that God lifts the veil from their hearts so that they can know Him and are enabled to draw nearer to Him, and that He wills this from eternity. God's love for man means that He brings man to His nearness, repels his sins, purifies his soul, and lifts the veil so that he can see Him with his inner sight.

This discussion of God's love of man is meant to make clear that it is man's love of God which is the subject of the highest mystical virtue and not God's love of man. There remain only the mystical virtues which result from love of God and are, consequently, controlled by it.

Of the specific virtues which follow from love of God, Ghazali mentions yearning, intimacy, and satisfaction, and discusses them in this order.

Yearning (shawq) can be defined as seeking and longing for something. By nature, man yearns toward the object of his love when it is not present or is partly perceived, for one does not long for what is present and fully grasped. As a mystical virtue, yearning, therefore, is only possible for those who acknowledge the existence of love of God. Ghazali points out two ways of yearning for God. The first is the way the gnostics (al-'ārifūn) perceive divine unity and is not absolutely pure, but mixed with some fancies characteristic of this life. Perfect clarity can only occur through the direct vision of God which occurs in the hereafter. Thus, those who have achieved perfect knowledge of God still "yearn" for full clarity in the hereafter. The second type of yearning arises from the fact that the number of divine things is limitless. An individual person can discover only some of them, while an endless number remains unknown to him. The mystic knows that such things exist and that they are all known to God and hence he yearns to know these unknown things. Therefore, while the first kind of yearning can be satisfied in the hereafter, through encountering God and having a vision of Him, the second kind does not seem to be satisfied either in this world or in the world to come because it is impossible that man should know all that God knows.

Ghazali regards intimacy (uns) as somewhat higher than yearning since yearning is characterized by restlessness. Intimacy is the cheerfulness and joy of the heart when it contemplates the beauty of the beloved. As a mystical virtue, intimacy is attained when the mystic is overwhelmed with the joy of nearness to God. The sign of being intimate with God is to be annoyed when associating with fellow men and delighted when contemplating God alone.

The most important of the three virtues produced by love of God is the mystical virtue of satisfaction (ridòā) with whatever God decrees. Ghazali considers love of God as a necessary precondition of satisfaction. He deals with satisfaction after love directly or indirectly in all three books in which he treats mystical virtues. He thus differs from al-Makkī who regards satisfaction as the eighth mystical station which immediately precedes the ninth and the final station, namely, love. Both thinkers consider love as the highest station, higher than satisfaction but al-Makkī, on the other hand, seems to distinguish between two kinds of satisfaction—the first is produced by trust and therefore precedes love; the second comes after love, but he does not discuss it in detail nor does he regard it as a station. Ghazali regards only this second kind of satisfaction as a mystical virtue because one has to love God first before he can truly be satisfied with His works.

The attainment of love of God is, therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of satisfaction; once a man loves God, he must necessarily be satisfied with God's works. In order to demonstrate this, Ghazali discusses the case of man's acceptance of and satisfaction with pains and hardships that may befall him. He suggests that there are two ways of being satisfied with these matters. (I) One may enjoy the love of a certain object to such a degree that he does not feel pain or hardship coming from other sources and thus, still more, he does not feel the pains which come from the beloved object. (2) Alternatively, a man may accept immediate pain and even desire it despite his natural aversion to pain because he expects pleasure to replace this pain in the future. Such is the case of a sick man who accepts the pain of surgery for the relief which will follow. If man can be satisfied with what opposes his desires and natural disposition, then he is even more likely to find satisfaction in those things to which he is naturally inclined, and if this is possible with regard to worldly affairs, it is even more likely in connection with love of God and the pleasures of the hereafter.

In his discussion of satisfaction and of the other two virtues produced by love of God, namely yearning and intimacy, Ghazali does not mention specifically the three elements necessary for every mystical virtue, i.e., knowledge, positive disposition, and action. However, in his discussion of satisfaction in particular, Ghazali deals with the positive disposition of satisfaction as well as the action produced by it. Knowledge is left out because satisfaction is a by-product of love of God and this love is impossible without the knowledge of God. As a positive disposition, "satisfaction" means delight in submitting to God's will. Ghazali enumerates three levels of such delight. (I) The first is hope of reward in the hereafter. (2) Next is cheerful acceptance of whatever befalls man because it is due to the will of God. (3) The highest level is reached when man's desire for anything becomes the same as God's will and gives rise to the highest joy.

Ghazali raises some questions about the action which is produced by the positive disposition of satisfaction. (I) Since man seeks to be completely satisfied with God's decree, this may lead to abandoning all actions, even acts of obedience, or else to licentiousness since all actions ultimately originate in God. If God is the source of all good and evil, should a man who is pleased with God welcome sin and evil in himself and in others ? According to Ghazali, though evil is ultimately traceable to God, man should be neither pleased with it nor with the one who commits it. Only ignorant and feeble-minded people regard acceptance of evil as the virtue of satisfaction. A sin is an act of God in the sense of ultimately originating in Him, and, from this viewpoint, man should express his satisfaction in "knowing" its origin. However, since man acquires his capacity to act from God, he is in a qualified sense responsible for sins which must, therefore, be rejected and despised. (2) The second question is related to supererogatory practices such as supplication (du'ā'). Since the man who loves God must be satisfied with whatever He decrees, does supplication conflict with this mystical virtue? Ghazali's answer is a clear no. Indeed, believers have been divinely commanded, through the Koran and prophetic traditions, to ask God for forgiveness as well as for aid to help them attain what is good and refrain from what is evil. Prophet of Islam himself constantly used to supplicate God in spite of the fact that he had achieved the highest degree of satisfaction. Thus recommended and praiseworthy actions do not conflict with satisfaction. Ghazali finds it necessary in connection with the relation of action to "satisfaction," to comment on a well-known prophetic tradition in which Muhammad forbade fleeing from a plague-stricken place. In Ghazali's view, fleeing from a plague does not in itself convey dissatisfaction with God's decree; the tradition merely indicates that some healthy persons must remain in the stricken place to look after the sick and the dead. Indeed, Ghazali says that in general it is a "decree" and order of God to flee from harmful things.

In order to show the superior merit of satisfaction as a mystical virtue, Ghazali compares the attitudes of three men toward death. The first prefers death because he yearns for an encounter with God. The second chooses to continue living so that he may serve God. The third says that he does not choose, but rather will be satisfied with whatever God chooses for him. The cases, Ghazali says, were presented before a well‐ known gnostic ('ārif), who sided with the one who displayed "satisfaction." Therefore, satisfaction is the highest mystical virtue produced by love of God which is truly the highest principal mystical virtue.

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