THE virtues appropriate to the few who seek ultimate happiness in the hereafter, that is, the vision of God, are established by Ghazali on the basis of a careful and elaborate interpretation of the hidden meanings of the divine commandments. This interpretation can be mastered by the truly learned men (' ulamā ' ) only. These are not jurists, theologians, or philosophers, but only the mystics ( s ò ūfiyyah ); and Ghazali identifies himself with the mystics:

I learned with certainty that it is above all the mystics who walk in the path of God; their life is the best life, their method the soundest method, their character the purest character ( wa akhlāquhum azkā al-akhlāq ).

Relating how he came to accept mysticism, Ghazali points out that he found that this discipline includes both knowledge and practice. It was relatively easy for Ghazali to acquire the mystics' knowledge. In a statement about his sources, he begins with al-Makkī's work, the Food of Hearts ( Qūt al-Qulūb ), which he seems to consider his textbook of mysticism. Then he mentions "the works of al-Muhòāsibī," followed by "the various scattered sayings ( mutafarriqāt )" of al-Junayd, al-Shiblī, and al-Bistòāmī, and finally "the discourses" of unnamed mystics. Ghazali starts with al-Makkī and al-Muhòāsibī, two mystics known for their effort to reconcile mysticism with Islamic religious teachings. Al-Bistòāmī, who was known for his mystical heresies, is mentioned last. The reference to the "discourses" of unnamed mystics may refer to other mystics with the reputation of al-Bistāmī. Ghazali, therefore, identifies himself more specifically with a tradition of mysticism which stood for synthesizing mystical and Islamic religious ideas. Al-Makkī's book, in particular "is of primary importance, as being the first and a very successful attempt to construct an overall design for orthodox Sufism." Ghazali quotes extensively from the Food of Hearts in the Revival, especially in Quarter IV, which deals with the mystical virtues. Whole sections are simply reproduced, and even the sayings of earlier mystics and learned men, prophetic traditions, and the traditions of the Companions, are set forth as presented by al-Makkī. This book, then, appears to be one of the sources through which Ghazali acquainted himself with the "scattered sayings" of early mystics.

Ghazali's originality can be seen in his selection, arrangement, and synthesis of the material he extracted from al-Makkī. Ghazali achieves a degree of clarity in his presentation of the basic features of mysticism by introducing a rational, theoretical framework to explain certain otherwise inexplicable aspects of mysticism. He had learned the language of the philosophers and theologians before he acquired a personal experience of the mystical life and was ready to perfect the work begun by al-Makkī and mystics like him. The speech (kalām) of the mystics, Ghazali points out, is incomplete and sometimes even defective because it is the habit of each one of them to give an account of his own spiritual state alone, without any regard for the states of others; consequently, their explicit statements diverge markedly. Because of this, Ghazali feels that rational knowledge is capable of giving a better and more objective account of spiritual experience.

Comparing the mystical and rational ways of achieving happiness, Ghazali remarks that the validity of the mystical way cannot be disputed. It brings those who practice it to their goal, which is the sublime state enjoyed by saints and prophets. But this kind of discipline is not without serious dangers. The mind may be adversely affected, the health of the body destroyed, and melancholy may ensue:

If the soul has not been exercised in the sciences that deal with fact and demonstration, it will acquire mental phantasms and suppose that truths are descending upon it. Many a Sufi has continued for ten years in one such fancy before escaping from it, whereas if he had a sound scientific education he would have been delivered from it at once.

Thus, mysticism is accepted by Ghazali as a superior way to true happiness, but it must always be rooted in and remain under the control of trained reason. For this reason he uses mysticism to explain and modify the philosophic and religious-legal paths to happiness and at the same time clarifies the mystical approach through the use of Islamic teachings and the philosophic tradition. He points out continuously that the mystic must always observe religious law and practice, making this the sign of the first resting place of those who are travelling the road to God ('alāmāt al-manzil al-awwal min manāzil al-sā'irīn). In Ghazali's view, the so-called earlier theorists of Sufism, such as al-Makkī, al-Sarrāj, and al-Qushayrī, did not fully succeed in their effort to reconcile mysticism with the tenets of Islam and at the same time clarify the mystical spiritual experiences. His own rational, theoretical explanation of these experiences is meant to give a clear account of them and, in addition, to synthesize or harmonize them with both Islamic and philosophic teachings in a homogeneous whole with a single ultimate end.

It has already been mentioned in the Introduction to this study that the core of Ghazali's mystical doctrine can be considered not only an ethical theory but also a theory of virtue. Ghazali distinguishes between the "knowledge of revelation" and the "knowledge of devotional practice." The former, in his view, cannot and must not be expressed or laid down in writing. Since only the latter can be expressed, and because Ghazali equates that with ethics in general and virtue in particular, the study of Ghazali's mysticism means essentially the study of the mystical virtues. The few, with whom Ghazali is concerned, on the highest level of moral refinement, are the mystics whose end is not knowledge or paradise, but nearness to God. The special "qualities" which these few can acquire for their special kind of ultimate happiness, therefore, lie beyond the specific limits of philosophic and religious-legal virtues. These qualities of the few which we call "mystical virtues" are concerned in the first place with the spiritual well-being of the individual in his special relation to God.

Ghazali discusses these mystical virtues in Quarter IV of the Revival. He also deals with them in a summary way in the fourth part of the Book of the Forty, Concerning the Principles of Religion ( Kitāb al-Arba'īn fī Usòūl al-Dīn), which is an abridgement of the Revival. A longer summary in Persian known as the Alchemy of Happiness ( Kīmiyā-yi Sa'ādat) deals with the same mystical virtues. However, the number and the order of these virtues differ from one book to the other. The arrangement of mystical virtues in these books is given in Table 2 (p. 159 ).

Ghazali's various arrangements of mystical virtues can also be compared with those of other mystical writers who preceded him, such as al-Kharrāz, al-Sarrāj, al-Makkī, al-Kalābādhī, al-Qushayrī, and al-Ansòārī al-Harawī, which are given in the table of the Sufi's lists of mystical virtues (Table 3, p. 160 ).

We pointed out in Chapter II above that Ghazali uses the expressions khuluq hasòan and khuluq mahòmūd to mean the same things as fadòīlah, i.e., virtue. When dealing with the religious-legal virtues, however, he uses the first two terms more often than the third. This can be explained by the fact that, for the Islamic traditional moralists, virtue is known as khuluq mahòmūd, khuluq hòasan, or khuluq karīm, while fadòīlah is the term commonly used by Muslim philosophers for virtue. In dealing specifically with mystical virtues, Ghazali calls them "commendable character traits" (akhlāq mahòmūdah). In the introduction to the Revival, he says "As for 'The Quarter on Things Leading to Salvation (Rub' al-Munjiyāt)' I shall mention in it every commendable character trait (khuluq mahòmūd)"; and in the Book of the Forty, he uses the same expression as the title of the fourth part, which deals with the mystical virtues. He also calls these mystical virtues the "qualities of salvation" (al-sòifāt al-munjiyāt).

Furthermore, he calls these virtues "stations" or "stages" (maqāmāt), terms which are more at home in the mystical tradition. Thus, to identify virtue, Ghazali moves from fadòīlah, which is more commonly used by the philosophers, to khuluq hasòan or khuluq mahòmūd, which are preferred by the Islamic traditional moralists, to sòifah and maqām, which are better known to the mystics. The term khuluq hasòan, however, seems to be the central expression which connects all the other terms, since it is used throughout Ghazali's treatment of philosophic, religious-legal, and mystical virtues.

Ghazali's identification of the virtues, character traits, and qualities of salvation is more than mere terminological usage. The mystical qualities, like the philosophic virtues, comprise the means to attain happiness. The philosophers understood passions as the stuff of virtue. Yet, most of the mystical qualities (in particular fear, hope, and love) are basically passions. Love, the last of these, is the highest mystical virtue man can acquire during his life.

According to Aristotle, the passions are: "desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain." He argues that:

Neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor the man who feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed.

Only when a passion is felt in a certain way can it become a virtue. Virtue is a state of character. It is concerned with passions and actions, in which both excess and deficiency are blamed, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristic of virtue, which is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us.

Ghazali follows this Aristotelian approach when dealing with the philosophic virtues, as we saw in Chapter II above. But when dealing with mystical virtues, he diverges sharply from it. Making use of the more elaborate and detailed treatment of the passions in Aristotle's Rhetoric, Ghazali takes the same passions which are used as the basis for the philosophic virtues, and looks at them in the light of his views of nearness to God. This is the genesis of Ghazali's "new" virtues which we have called mystical. For example, because the philosophers regard death as the object of the greatest human fear, they conclude that fear is a defect for which the corresponding virtue is courage. Ghazali, on the other hand, looks at the same passion in the light of man's relation to God, who ought to be feared both in this life and the next, and concludes that the right state of character is "fear of God." Thus the passions are raised to higher levels beyond the usual low rank assigned to them in the treatment of "philosophic virtues." In the same way, Ghazali frequently takes a disposition generally understood in terms of man's relation with his fellow men, abstracts it from the political context, and reformulates it in terms of his concept of nearness to God. For example, he takes "trust" as exercised by man toward his fellow men, and modifies it in terms of man's special relation to God, thus establishing the mystical virtue of "trust in God."

In addition, Ghazali establishes these mystical virtues through methods similar to those by which the philosophic virtues are established. The only change he introduces concerns the object and the end of virtue. The ultimate end, according to him, necessitates purifying the soul and freeing it from the body as far as possible, so that it may devote itself entirely to the highest passion, namely, love of God. Since this highest passion is private, the end of the mystical virtues transcends political activity: they free man, not only from the body, but from the city as well.

After establishing the mystical qualities as virtues, Ghazali emphasizes what he calls their basic characteristics. In his view, each one of these virtues comprises three elements which follow one another consecutively. The first is knowledge, which produces the second, a positive disposition (hòāl), which in turn causes the third, action. This distinction reflects Ghazali's independence from earlier Sufi accounts of these virtues inasmuch as he uses nonmystical doctrines to explain mystical notions. This kind of analysis of the essential components of the mystical virtues obviously belongs to the philosophic tradition. However, whereas he enumerated four basic elements in connection with the philosophic virtues—namely, faculty, knowledge, positive disposition, and action—he eliminates the category, faculty, in relation to the mystical virtues. He does not give his reasons for doing so. One can only assume that, while a psychic faculty is of importance in a system which depends primarily on unaided reason, it is of secondary importance in relation to a discipline which relies on divine assistance. Moreover, in his discussion of philosophic virtue, Ghazali maintains that virtue applies only to the positive disposition from among the four above-mentioned elements, whereas here he considers three of these as necessary components of mystical virtues. It seems that Ghazali's emphasis on all the three basic elements, here, is a theoretical orientation which he introduces into his discussion in order to clarify these mystical virtues, which are usually extremely vague in the mystical manuals. Nonetheless, in the course of his detailed discussion of some of these virtues, Ghazali himself singles out the positive disposition as that which is most properly called virtue; knowledge is something which leads to it, and action is its product.

Ghazali's independence from earlier Sufi accounts is also revealed in his manipulation of mystical terminology. Although he chooses certain technical terms current in mystical literature, he tends to define them in his own way. Station (maqām) was usually distinguished by earlier mystics from state (hòāl). According to al-Qushayrī, a station signifies a spiritual plateau in the novice's progress to God, which is the result of the mystic's personal effort and endeavor, whereas a state is a spiritual mood depending, not upon the mystic, but upon God: " 'States' are gifts; while 'stations' are earnings." In general, Sufi authors insist upon the effort of the soul as it approaches the station, just as they emphasize the received character of the state. Furthermore, stations are permanent, while states are transitory. Al-Sarrāj, the author of a well-known early Sufi manual, regards stations as moral habits and states as psychological conditions of mind. According to Ghazali, in contrast, the difference between states and stations is one of degree and not of kind. When a character trait of the soul becomes permanent and persists, it is a station; if, on the other hand, it occurs sporadically, it is a state. This definition is reiterated in the "Dictation (al-Imlā')", a book Ghazali wrote to defend the Revival and explain the mystical terms used in it. This view of states and stations shows that only stations can be regarded as virtues, since stability is an essential characteristic of virtue. It is for this reason that Ghazali calls mystical virtues stations.

Because of the fact that various stations and states are closely related to each other, and each Sufi has his own doctrine of spiritual refinement, mystical writers differ with regard to the definition and arrangement of these stations and states. Ghazali, likewise, presents his own arrangement of these stations, but he does not enumerate a specific number of them as do some of the Sufi writers who preceded him. ( Al-Makkī, for instance, maintains that they are nine). Nevertheless, Ghazali preserves the notion of order or hierarchy in mystical virtues, that is, which virtue must be acquired first, which one should follow, and, finally, which is the highest virtue which one can acquire. He agrees with most of the earlier Sufis in regarding "repentance" (tawbah) as the first station for the novice. At the other pole, he follows al-Makkī in regarding love (mahòabbah) as the highest station possible for man in this life. In his view, repentance, patience, gratitude, hope, fear, poverty, asceticism, divine unity, and trust, in this order, all lead to love; whereas yearning, intimacy, and satisfaction are the fruits (thimār) or the by-products of love.

These virtues, which are also known as stations, are the principal mystical virtues because they are presented as the major plateaus to be reached by the few in their pursuit of ultimate happiness. In this, Ghazali agrees with al-Makkī.

In addition to these mystical virtues, Ghazali enumerates six more qualities of the soul which he does not specifically call stations. These are not presented by al-Makkī as stations, although he deals with some of them as separate and independent mystical attributes. Nevertheless, they are mystical virtues in the sense that they are attributes and qualities of salvation which must be acquired by the mystic. According to Ghazali, these six mystical virtues can be classified in three groups. They are ordered as follows: resolve, sincerity, truthfulness; vigilance, self-examination; and finally, meditation.

Ghazali deals with these six virtues at the end of the Revival, after completing his discussion of love and its by-products. There is no transition in his presentation between love and resolve, the first of these virtues. Indeed, he does not mention any of the six mystical virtues when describing the order of the virtues that lead to love of God. In the Alchemy of Happiness, however, Ghazali (who orders these six virtues in the same way as in the Revival) places all of them after "asceticism" and before "divine unity," but in the Book of the Forty, Ghazali places the first three of these virtues between gratitude and trust, and does not mention the other three virtues at all. That Ghazali moves these six virtues back and forth together and that in every case he presents them as a group in the same order, suggests that they form a cohesive group somehow outside the principal mystical virtues. Ghazali describes the mystical virtues in question as a means of bringing about, supporting, and perfecting the principal mystical virtues. In this respect they pertain equally to all principal mystical virtues. Thus, a man may be truthful in his repentance and, when he acquires love, he may become truthful in his love. Finally, although this group of mystical virtues shares with the principal mystical virtues the characteristic of being directed toward

God, they seem to be primarily concerned with the internal relationships of the faculties within the soul.

Therefore, the basic characteristic of these six mystical virtues is to prepare the way and provide the psychological basis for the major mystical virtues. To distinguish between these two groups, we call the major ones principal mystical virtues and the others supporting mystical virtues. The function of these supporting mystical virtues in preparing the soul for the fulfillment of a perfect acquisition of each principal virtue suggests the desirability of dealing with them first.

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